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The distinction between justifications and excuses is a familiar one to most of 
us who work either in moral philosophy or legal philosophy.  But exactly how it 
should be understood is a matter of considerable disagreement.  My aim in this 
paper is, first, to sort out the differences and try to figure out what underlying 
disagreements account for them.  I give particular attention to the following 
question: Does a person who acts on a reasonable but mistaken belief have a 
justification, or only an excuse?  One disagreement I highlight concerns the extent 
to which justification is primarily about agents rather than about actions (viewed 
in isolation from the agents performing them).  Those who think, as I do, of “His 
action, X, was justified” as “He was justified in doing X” are far more likely to 
allow that justification requires reasonable belief and does not require truth, than 
are those who think of “His action, X, was justified” as “Although actions of this 
type usually are prohibited, X is in these circumstances in fact permissible.”  In 
addition to (and sometimes in the course of) sorting out the differences and tracing 
them to some underlying disagreements, I defend the reasonable belief view of 
justification against some objections, and argue that, whether or not we continue 
to use the term “justified” in a way that does not require truth (and does require 
reasonable belief), we need the concept.  Contrary to the claims of some who 
reject the reasonable belief view of justification, justification thus understood does 
not reduce to excuse. 
 
I. 
 
In law, philosophy, and everyday life, we recognize a distinction between 
justifications and excuses.  Many (though not all) of us think the distinction an 
important one.  Just how do justifications differ from excuses?  I will argue in 
favor of tethering justification to reasonable belief rather than to truth (thus 
allowing that mistaken self-defense should count as justified as long as the 
mistaken belief is reasonable).  But I am equally interested in diagnosing where the 
disagreements arise.  To that end, I will spend some time setting out what is 
uncontroversial, seeing how far one can go before bumping up against 
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controversy—not, it turns out, very far—and examining the controversies as they 
arise.  I will suggest that at the root of the disagreements concerning how to 
understand justification are (a) ambiguities concerning both the word “right” and 
the question “Was S’s action justified?” and, related to the latter, (b) differences 
concerning the extent to which justification is primarily about agents rather than 
mainly about actions.1   
Although my focus is on justification and excuse in law, my remarks are by 
and large intended to apply to justification and excuse in ethics more generally.  
My working assumption is that the distinction between justification and excuse in 
law is continuous with the distinction between justification and excuse outside of 
law, in the ethics of everyday life.2  It is of course possible that criminal law will 
turn out to require a distinction between justification and excuse that is different 
from the distinction in ethics, but I would regard it as unfortunate if that were the 
case.  I thus take it as a strong desideratum in an account of the distinction between 
justification and excuse in law that it mirror the distinction between justification 
and excuse outside of law.3
I begin with what is familiar and (mostly) uncontroversial so as to trace the 
points where disagreements arise. 
 
II. 
 
Defenses (setting aside those based not at all on culpability, and entirely on 
pragmatic concerns) are usually classified in philosophy of law and in criminal law 
as either excuses or justifications.4  Insanity is an excuse; self-defense is a 
                                                                                                                            
1   Of course justification can be about belief, as well.  My view is that it is less about the 
action than about the agent (and less about the belief than it is about the person qua believer).   
2   I say “continuous with” rather than “identical to” because some of the concepts deployed to 
explain the distinction will no doubt need to be cashed out a little differently in law than in ethics.  
For instance, when we say “S is not blameworthy” in the context of criminal law, our concern is that 
S not be subjected to punishment (at the hands of the state), and not that S not be looked down upon 
by his neighbors for what he did.  By “the ethics of everyday life” I mean to indicate that I am 
speaking not of justification as it is understood in some particular ethical theory, but of justification 
as we use the concept in everyday life.  
3   An alternative approach would not speak of justification simpliciter but would instead 
separate moral justification from legal justification and take care always to specify which sense of 
‘justification’ is intended.  For such an approach, see SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING: THE 
SELF-DEFENCE JUSTIFICATION OF HOMICIDE (1994); see infra Part VII. 
4   A different approach, taken in H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 14–15 
(1968), distinguishes three types of defenses: excuse, justification, and mitigation.  I find this a 
peculiar grouping, blurring two separate issues.  One issue is whether the defense is complete or only 
partial, complete defenses being those that result in acquittal, whereas partial defenses merely reduce 
the crime to a lesser one (usually murder to manslaughter).  What Hart calls “mitigation” can be 
either formal or informal.  Formal mitigation is the same thing as a partial defense, and informal 
mitigation is simply the handing out of a lighter sentence than one would otherwise mete out.  The 
second issue is whether the defense is a justification or an excuse.  These strike me as distinct issues, 
and although we should leave open the possibility that a justification has to be complete to be a 
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justification.5  Admittedly, some defenses are difficult to classify.  Provocation, a 
partial defense, seems to have elements of both justification and excuse.6  Duress 
also poses problems, but less weighty ones.  Unlike provocation, it does not seem 
to be a hybrid.  Instead, depending on the particulars of the case, duress can be a 
justification, but usually is only an excuse.7  Although one might take these 
difficulties as evidence that the distinction between justifications and excuses is a 
hopeless one, I assume for the purposes of this essay that it is not hopeless, and try 
to figure out how best to draw it.  
I said that duress is “only an excuse,” and this (emphasizing “only” rather 
than “duress”) brings me to a point that I hope is uncontroversial: “justified” and 
“excused” are not quite on a par, morally.  Given a choice between having some 
action of mine deemed justified and having it deemed excused, I would rather that 
it be deemed justified.  Most people would presumably share this preference.  The 
reason is that to say that an action is justified is to say (insofar as we focus on the 
action, rather than the agent) that though the action is of a type that is usually 
wrong, in these circumstances it was not wrong.8  To say that an action is excused, 
                                                                                                                            
justification (and likewise for excuses), I see no reason to take that as a starting point and to shape 
our classification of defenses accordingly. 
Still another approach is that of Sarah Buss, who argues in Justified Wrongdoing, 31 NOUS 337, 
338 (1997), that “excuses and justifications are not two distinct sorts of exculpating explanations” 
and that a “justification can be an excuse.”  I hope in another paper to examine her arguments, but in 
this paper I start from the premise that they are distinct and try to figure out how best to draw the 
distinction. 
5   Although usually classified as a justification, self-defense is sometimes classified as an 
excuse, the idea then being not that self-defense is permissible, but rather that there is a natural 
instinct to defend oneself, and that therefore people cannot be expected to refrain from using violence 
when they believe it necessary for self-preservation.  See Claire Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a 
Rational Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 621 (1996).  It is hard to see why one would regard self-defense 
as a mere excuse unless one holds that killing is always wrong, hence that killing in self-defense is 
never permissible; though if one accepts the positive rightness thesis, see infra Part VI, classifying 
self-defense as a justification becomes problematic (since in some instances killing in self-defense, 
though permissible, would not appear to be positively right).   
6   I address the issue of how to classify provocation in Marcia Baron, Killing in the Heat of 
Passion, in SETTING THE MORAL COMPASS: ESSAYS BY WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS (Cheshire Calhoun ed., 
2004); see also UNIACKE, supra note 3, at 13–14.  Uniacke classifies provocation as an excuse, as 
does Joshua Dressler in his Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult 
Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959 (2002).  
7   For discussions of duress, see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, ch. 23 
(3d ed. 2001); ROBERT SCHOPP, JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES AND JUST CONVICTIONS (1998); Joshua 
Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 
62 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (1989); Claire Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense 
in Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 251 (1995). 
8   I have spoken just now in terms of actions being justified or excused, but as emerges in 
Parts III and IV, I think it more apt to speak of persons being justified in doing X, and of persons 
being excused for having done X; see also infra note 25.  I should also mention that some would 
object to “not wrong” in the italicized statement, claiming that it results in too “weak” a statement of 
what it is for an action to be justified.  See infra Part VI. 
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by contrast, is to say that it was indeed wrong (and the agent did commit the act 
we are saying was wrong), but the agent is not blameworthy.  The reason why the 
agent is not blameworthy can be something about the agent, something about the 
circumstances (conjoined with facts about humans in general), or both.9    
Care is needed in spelling out exactly what, if we say the agent is excused, we 
are denying.  We are saying the agent isn’t . . . isn’t what?  Isn’t deserving of 
punishment and isn’t deserving of blame; but also isn’t accountable?  Not 
necessarily; at least, not if “not accountable” means there is nothing he or she 
should be expected to do to make amends.  If, due to a medication (which I have 
taken exactly as the doctor directed), my hands shake, with the result that I break a 
piece of your porcelain, I owe you an apology and should offer to buy you a 
replacement even though (let us assume) I am not blameworthy.  In general, an 
obligation to make amends may be in order even if I am not blameworthy—
indeed, even if I acted justifiably.10   
That justifications and excuses are not on a par, morally, is uncontroversial.  
One does not want to be excused unless an excuse is called for (or unless the only 
alternative is to be punished); and it is called for only if one has done something 
wrong.  For example, if a colleague says to me, “Of course, we could hardly have 
expected you to do X, when you had just given birth a few weeks earlier, so no one 
blames you,” and I believe that in fact it was not my job to do X, period, I will not 
be entirely happy to be told that I am excused.  I will be tempted to set the record 
straight: X was someone else’s responsibility, not mine.  I did nothing wrong at all.  
As noted above, the reason why a person is not deserving of blame can be 
something about the person, or something about the situation together with facts 
about humans in general.  Excuses thus divide into two rather different groups, the 
first of which is much more akin to justifications than is the second: 
  
(1) those (such as duress) that come into play because the situation was 
such that it was extremely difficult for that actor and would be 
extremely difficult for most actors to avoid acting wrongly or 
unlawfully; and 
                                                                                                                            
9   The reason need not be that the agent did not act voluntarily.  Excuses can be in order even 
if the agent acted voluntarily; indeed, it seems a mistake to think that excuses ever come into play if 
the action was not voluntary.  See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. III, ch. 1 (Terence Irwin 
trans., Hackett Pub., 2d ed. 2000); Aristotle clearly sees excuses as coming into play only if the 
action was voluntary.  He introduces the idea of excuses when he explains that the fact that S did X 
voluntarily, where X is something objectionable, does not entail that S is blameworthy for having 
done X.  Some legal scholars, however, speak of excuses as if they apply primarily and 
paradigmatically to involuntary responses.  George Fletcher, for example, writes that “[e]xcuses 
apply on behalf of morally involuntary responses to danger; they acknowledge that when individuals 
merely react rather than choose to do wrong, they cannot fairly be held accountable.”  GEORGE 
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 811 (1978); see also Finkelstein, supra note 7.  
10  This is an established principle in tort law, clearly enunciated in Vincent v. Lake Erie 
Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910), and affirmed in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
197 (1974). 
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(2) those (insanity being the paradigmatic instance) that come into play 
because of some peculiarity about the actor that makes it very 
difficult for him or her to act as the law requires. 
 
Being excused on grounds of the second sort is clearly less desirable (barring 
ulterior motives, such as qualifying for a disability pension) than being excused on 
grounds of the first sort.  Still, even an excuse of the first sort is less desirable, 
from the perspective of most agents, than a justification. 
 
III. 
 
Although in the previous section I tried to present the distinction in a way that 
all can agree on, saving for a little later the disagreements, I found that one cannot 
say very much about it without saying something that will raise hackles (to my 
mind, philosophically interesting hackles).  My classification of excuses will draw 
opposition from those (e.g., Douglas Husak) who hold that it is important to 
distinguish sharply between appraisals of acts and appraisals of agents, and who 
regard the following as imposing a constraint on how justifications and excuses 
should be characterized: “By definition, if the facts that comprise the defense 
describe the defendant’s act, they constitute a justification; if these facts describe 
the defendant himself, they constitute an excuse.”11  Husak emphasizes that 
“justifications focus entirely on actions, not agents” and admonishes Kent 
Greenawalt for blurring “the distinction between judgments about acts and 
judgments about actors.”12  I do not think it generally important to draw a sharp 
distinction between appraisals of actions and appraisals of agents.  It is an 
undercurrent of both this paper and some of my other work that it is often better to 
blur them, speaking in terms of the agent’s conduct and thus about both action and 
character (as reflected in the agent’s choice of this course of conduct and in her 
motivation and attitudes).13   
That I reject Husak’s definitional claim is evident from my characterization of 
excuses.  The facts comprising excuses of type (2) describe the agent herself, but 
those constituting excuses of type (1) describe the circumstances of the act, human 
nature in general (more precisely, what is deemed to be too much, at least in that 
particular society, to expect of people-in-general), as well as the agent.  
One might, without endorsing the general principle that act-appraisals should 
be sharply distinguished from agent-appraisals, nonetheless affirm Husak’s claim 
                                                                                                                            
11  Douglas Husak, Justifications and the Criminal Liability of Accessories, 80 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 494, 496–97 (1989).  
12  Id. at 497.  Husak is referring to Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from 
Excuses, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (1986).  
13  See Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics, in THREE METHODS OF ETHICS: A DEBATE 32–64 (1997); 
MARCIA BARON, KANTIAN ETHICS ALMOST WITHOUT APOLOGY (1995); Marcia Baron, The Ethics of 
Duty/Ethics of Virtue Debate and Its Relevance to Educational Theory, 2 EDUC. THEORY 135, 138–43 
(1985); see also Michael Stocker, Act and Agent Evaluations, 27 REV. METAPHYSICS 42 (1973). 
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that justification applies only to acts, not to agents.  Although the claim does not 
bear directly on what I said above about excuses, it is very much at odds with my 
position on justifications, and therefore needs to be addressed.  What reasons are 
there (apart from an underlying principle of the sort I have just questioned) for this 
position?   
If one supposed that the word “justified” is—or should be—used only 
prospectively, to announce that actions of this type, though generally illegal 
[wrong], are legal [permissible or right] in circumstances C, it would make sense 
to say that justification applies only to acts.14  We are announcing that acts of this 
type, in these circumstances, are permitted.  Something ordinarily wrong is, in that 
sense, justified here. 
If the claim is that the word “justified” in fact is used only prospectively, it is 
patently false.  It hardly needs to be pointed out that it is quite common to use the 
word “justified” retrospectively to say that So-and-So was justified in doing X.  
Perhaps someone will claim that this use of “justified” is just sloppy speech, and 
that we either should not use the word retrospectively or should do so only to ask 
“Was his action justified?” and never “Was he justified in acting as he did?”  I 
cannot imagine any reason for this stand (other than the general principle 
mentioned above).  I see no basis for thinking that to assert that (or wonder if) an 
agent was justified in acting as he did invariably involves some mistake or 
confusion. 
 
IV. 
 
Although the main point of the previous section was to contest the claim that 
justification applies only to acts, not to agents, that discussion also brings to light 
an ambiguity that underlies the disagreement over whether to tie justification to 
reasonable belief or instead to truth.  “Was his action justified?” is ambiguous 
between “Was he justified in acting as he did?” and “Was the action—viewed 
without any attention to the actor’s beliefs and motives—justified?”  To see the 
non-equivalence of these questions, consider the following example: D killed V out 
of revenge, but, unbeknownst to D, V was about to kill him, and would have, had 
D not killed V.  Should we say that D’s action was justified?  Not if by that we 
mean that D was justified in acting as he did.  He had no inkling (let’s suppose) 
that V was about to kill him.  Without the belief that he needed to kill V to save his 
own life—and without having acted for that reason15—he was not justified in 
                                                                                                                            
14  I insert the bracketed words in an effort to keep in mind the question of whether what I say 
also applies outside of a legal context. 
15  In law—at least in the United States—there is generally no requirement that D have acted 
for that reason in order to have a justification; but outside of a legal context, this is something we 
would, I think, insist on.  Suppose that D set out to kill V to get revenge, and then learned that V was 
aiming to kill him.  Imagine that although D knew V was aiming to kill him, D killed V not to save 
his life—for some reason D does not particularly care whether he lives or dies, as long as he gets the 
revenge he is seeking—but for the reason he had at the outset, namely to get back at V for some slight 
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killing V.16  Suppose that we instead understand by “his action was justified” that 
the action abstracted from the actor’s beliefs, motives and ends was justified.  Thus 
understood, should the claim be affirmed?  An affirmative answer is at least 
plausible.  Killing V, given V’s intention of killing D and given that there was no 
other way to thwart V, would have been permissible under the circumstances.  For 
this reason we may want to say that the action was justified.      
This ambiguity in “justified”—specifically, in “Was D’s action justified?”—
explains some of the disagreement over how justification differs from excuse, and 
whether justification should be tied to reasonable belief or to truth.  Those who tie 
it to truth—holding both that a mistaken reasonable belief cannot render an action 
justified and that the action is justified in the scenario just described (where D had 
no inkling that V was about to kill him)—conceive of justification as applying 
paradigmatically to actions divorced from their particular actors (and from the 
actor’s beliefs and motives).  Those who tie it to reasonable belief—holding (i) 
that an action is not rendered unjustified by a mistaken belief about a material 
element, provided that the belief is held on reasonable grounds and (ii) that an 
action is not justified in the scenario described above (where D had no inkling that 
V was about to kill him)—think of “D’s action was justified” as meaning “D’s 
acting as he did was justified.”  For them (myself among them), justification 
applies mainly to actors, the question being “Was he justified in acting as he did?”  
I will return to this disagreement in Part VI. 
 
V. 
 
For some of the same reasons why my remarks on excuses might spark 
disagreement, Part II might be objected to for what I do not include in my list of 
(mostly) uncontroversial points about justifications and excuses and how they 
differ.  Justifications and excuses are often differentiated in the following way:   
(a) “Justifications are defenses that arise from properties or characteristics of acts; 
excuses are defenses that arise from properties or characteristics of actors.”17  I do 
not take that characterization to be uncontroversial at all; indeed, I reject the claim, 
for reasons indicated above.   
Other characterizations of the difference between justifications and excuses 
that I reject include that (b) it is actions and beliefs that are (or fail to be) justified, 
and people who are (or fail to be) excused; and (c) justifications are objective, and 
excuses subjective.  Regarding (b): as indicated above, people can be justified (or 
fail to be justified) in doing X; it is no less correct to speak of a person being 
                                                                                                                            
to D.  Morally this would seem not to be a case of self-defense.  (One wonders too how ready jurors 
would be, if they had all this information before them, to acquit D on self-defense grounds).   
16  But see UNIACKE, supra note 3, at 20–21.  See also infra Part VII.  
17  Husak, supra note 11, at 496. 
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justified in doing X than to speak of an action being justified.18  I reject (c) both 
because justifications have a subjective component,19 and because excuses of type 
(1) above have an objective component.  Duress (for instance) requires, in the 
language of the Model Penal Code, that the actor was coerced to commit the 
offense in question “by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his 
person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his 
situation would have been unable to resist.”20  It is not enough that the actor was 
“unable to resist”; there is the objective component, as well: a person of reasonable 
firmness would in that situation have been unable to resist.21
In addition, justifications are sometimes characterized as follows (quoting 
what Paul Robinson presents as the “general principle of justification”):              
(d) “conduct is justified if it avoids a greater harm or evil than it causes.”22  This 
too I regard not only as controversial, but as mistaken, though for a different 
reason than those I put forward in opposition to (a)–(c).  As Husak has 
emphasized, definitional questions need to be distinguished from substantive 
questions.  What this entails for purposes of this discussion is that the question of 
what justification is needs to be distinguished from the question of when conduct is 
justified.  I therefore take issue with Robinson for presupposing a particular 
normative theory when he puts forward an account of what justification is.  To say 
what justification is, is not—and should not be—to say what general justificatory 
principle we should accept.23   
Finally, justifications are sometimes said to differ from excuses in the 
following way: (e) If S is justified in doing X, no one has the right to interfere to 
stop S from doing X, and anyone has the right to aid S in doing X.24  I will explain 
in Part VIII why I think this is doubtful (while granting that it is much more 
plausible to assert that justifications have this entailment than to assert that excuses 
do). 
                                                                                                                            
18  One might argue that this conflates justifications with excuses, and that if we say “S was 
justified in doing X” we really mean that S is (or should be) excused, and are simply speaking 
sloppily.  I will address this objection in Part VII, infra.  
19  Clearly this is a contentious matter.  Although it is standard in law to require, for self-
defense (and other justification defenses) the relevant belief, those who support what I call the 
material rightness thesis in its pure form reject this requirement.  See infra Part VI.  
20  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
21  See Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1897, 1898 (1984) (emphasis added), for a critical discussion of this and other ways of 
distinguishing justifications from excuses.  For challenges to Greenawalt’s arguments and to his 
thesis that “Anglo-American criminal law should not attempt to distinguish between justification and 
excuse in a fully systematic way,” see B. Sharon Byrd, Wrongdoing and Attribution: Implications 
Beyond the Justification-Excuse Distinction, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1289 (1987). 
22  PAUL H. ROBINSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW 665 (1988); see also 1 PAUL H. 
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 21 (1984).  
23  Husak, supra note 11, at 498–99.   
24  See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 971–80 
(1985). 
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VI. 
 
I now want to bring into focus an assertion from Part II, and leave to one side 
the ambiguity discussed in Part IV and the related issue of whether to think of 
justification as applying primarily to actors or to actions.  If we set that aside,25 I 
think almost everyone can assent to the following way of differentiating 
justifications from excuses (depending on how “right” is understood): To say that 
an action is justified is to say that although it is of a type that is usually wrong, 
under these circumstances it was right.  To say that an action is excused is to say 
that it was wrong (and the agent did indeed commit the act we are saying was 
wrong), but the agent is not blameworthy.  Supposing agreement on this, let’s see 
where disagreements arise once details are filled in, and ambiguities attended to.     
One disagreement can be traced to an ambiguity concerning the word “right”; 
the other is due in part to another such ambiguity, and in part to the issue that I am 
setting aside for now (concerning whether justification is primarily about persons 
or primarily about actions).   
One’s action is justified, it is widely held, only if, under the circumstances, it 
is right; but some (myself included) intend by “right” in this context simply “not 
wrong,” while others mean something more.  “Right” can mean simply permissible 
or it can mean obligatory (or something in between permissible and obligatory).  
Understood in the more restrictive way, “right” can mean, among other things, 
“obligatory” or “morally best” or (say some) “morally recommended”—and it is a 
further source of confusion that those who hold that it cannot, for purposes of 
justification, include the merely permissible may differ on exactly how it should be 
cashed out. 
Second, although when we speak of an action being right we often mean (a) 
that it was right materially (for example, if we are consequentialists, that it did in 
fact bring about the best consequences compared to other actions available to the 
agent at the time), we sometimes mean (b) that it was right formally, meaning that 
it was the right choice (or at least, a permissible choice) for an agent in that 
situation to make at that time, given the information that was available to him 
(given what he knew and/or should have known).26  The idea in (b) is that a 
reasonable person in that situation might well have opted as the agent in question 
                                                                                                                            
25  The only problem is that it is not possible to set them entirely aside, for it is impossible to 
come up with a statement that brings out the issue I want to bring out yet is neutral between putting 
the focus on actions, and putting it on agents.  I of course want it to be on agents, but it would 
unfairly help my case to so frame it.  So I have opted (here and in Part II) to frame the contrast in a 
way that, by speaking in terms of actions, favors a view opposed to mine. 
26  I chose the terms “materially” and “formally” rather than “objectively” and “subjectively” 
because “subjectively wrong” suggests “wrong according to the agent”—and that is not the idea at 
all.  Relatedly, “materially” and “formally” have the advantage that neither one sounds as if it is an 
inferior, or watered down, version of the other; whereas “subjectively wrong” sounds less fully 
wrong than “objectively wrong.”  
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did.27  In consequentialist terms, “formally right” would mean that it was the right 
choice because a reasonable person in the agent’s situation might well have judged 
that action to be the one most likely to bring about the best consequences. 
That “right” can mean either permissible or something more is obvious, and 
requires little comment.  That legal scholars differ accordingly as to how to 
understand “justified” is also well known.  The disagreement is prominent enough 
that careful statements of what it is for an action to be justified are often put 
disjunctively so as to reflect both views.  H.L.A. Hart writes that a justified act is 
one that “the law does not condemn, or even welcomes,”28 and Joshua Dressler, 
quoting Hart, draws attention to the fact that “‘justification’ 
 . . . may imply a positive judgment about conduct . . . or . . . may constitute a 
weaker value judgment. . . . Some scholars believe that the concept of 
‘justification’ necessarily implies the stronger meaning; others favor an 
interpretation broad enough to include both characterizations.”29  I will refer to the 
view that justification necessarily implies the stronger meaning as the positive 
rightness thesis. 
By contrast, the other ambiguity has received little attention in the context of 
justification, and since space does not permit me to discuss both at length, I will 
devote more discussion to it and to the disagreements that can be traced to it (more 
precisely, traced to it and to the issue I said I would set to one side, concerning 
whether justification is primarily about persons or primarily about actions).30    
Whatever degree of goodness or rightness one thinks necessary for 
justification, there is room for debate as to whether conduct can be justified if the 
conditions for the action’s permissibility do not obtain, but the agent believes on 
reasonable grounds that they do.  Which stand one takes will be shaped by whether 
one thinks of “right” in this context as “formally right” or as “materially right.”    
                                                                                                                            
27  Exactly how to understand “reasonable person” is a topic that I cannot take up here, apart 
from offering two comments.  First, I purposely said “might well have opted” rather than “would 
have opted” because I think it a mistake to suppose that all reasonable people would arrive at 
precisely the same decision, in any given situation, given the same information.  There may be more 
than one reasonable option.  Second, I understand “reasonable” objectively rather than subjectively 
and understand “objectively reasonable” in a fairly broad sense, roughly as spelled out in People v. 
Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986), though substituting “person” for “man” in the instruction 
endorsed there.  I discuss the question of how “reasonably believes” should be understood for 
purposes of self-defense in Self-Defense: The Reasonable Belief Requirement (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
28  HART, supra note 4, at 13. 
29  DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 206 n.8; see also Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A 
Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155 (1987).  Some, however, 
speak as if there is no controversy.  See Finkelstein, supra note 5, at 624: “In the criminal law, to call 
a violation of a prohibitory norm justified is to say not only that it is permissible, but that it is 
encouraged.”  
30  For discussions of the positive rightness thesis (with particular attention to Fletcher), see 
Husak, supra note 11, at 499–504; Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification 
in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 69–87 
(1984); see also supra text accompanying note 22.  
  
2005]                            JUSTIFICATIONS AND EXCUSES 397 
Those who understand “right” as “materially right” hold that S’s reasonable 
but false belief cannot justify her conduct.  If S reasonably but falsely believes that 
Joe is about to attack her (and that she can avoid injury only by attacking him), her 
belief does not change the fact that her attack on him was unnecessary.  An action 
can be justified, it is claimed, only by the way things are.  An action taken in 
mistaken self-defense thus cannot be justified, though it may be excusable.  An 
action is justified only when it is materially right—only when it is not based on a 
false belief regarding the material elements of the defense.  (Here, too, “right” can 
be understood either as merely permissible or as more than that; for simplicity, I 
will speak in terms of permissibility).  If the conditions for the permissibility of the 
action do not obtain, the agent’s believing—even reasonably—that they do obtain 
does not make it so, and so the action is not justified (and the agent is not justified 
in so acting).  Those who endorse this position—which I will call the material 
rightness thesis—do not claim that although the action was not justified, the agent 
was justified in so acting, so I will construe the material rightness thesis to entail 
that one cannot be justified in doing A if A is based on a false belief (about 
something the truth of which is crucial for A to be permissible).31  
There are two possible versions of the material rightness thesis.  In its pure 
form it holds that belief is not required at all; an act of killing another is justified if 
the victim was about to kill the attacker (and would have, had the attacker not 
killed him), even if the attacker was unaware of this.  The other form requires both 
that V was in fact about to kill D and that D believed this.  In other words, one 
version requires only that V was about to kill D; the other requires this together 
with a belief on D’s part that V was about to kill D.  I will refer to the latter as the 
qualified material rightness thesis. 32  It is qualified in that it does not allow that 
material rightness alone suffices for justification; justification requires the relevant 
belief, as well as material rightness.33  (We might also subdivide the qualified 
                                                                                                                            
31  The positive rightness and material rightness theses are logically distinct, but they lend 
each other support.  In addition, both are nourished by (though they do not require) a consequentialist 
outlook, and in particular, a consequentialist outlook that evaluates actions in terms of the states of 
affairs that they bring about.  For an example of an endorsement of both theses—an endorsement that 
reflects a consequentialist outlook—see ROBINSON, supra note 22, § 21; see also infra text 
accompanying notes 45–46. 
32  Those who endorse the material rightness thesis in its pure form include MICHAEL S. 
MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 65 (1997); 2 ROBINSON, supra 
note 22, § 121(c); Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1551, 1563–65 (1999).  John Gardner holds the qualified view; see John Gardner, 
Justifications and Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 105, 117 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 
1996), as does Claire Finkelstein, supra note 5, at 625–31, and FLETCHER, supra note 9, at ch. 10.  
33  Although self-defense law in the United States typically follows the reasonable belief view 
of justification, there are some exceptions.  North Dakota v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983), 
endorses the qualified material rightness position.  Justice Walle wrote in Leidholm: “[A] person who 
believes that the force he uses is necessary to prevent imminent unlawful harm is justified in using 
such force if his belief is a correct belief; that is to say, if his belief corresponds with what actually is 
the case.  If, on the other hand, a person reasonably but incorrectly believes that the force he uses is 
necessary to protect himself against imminent harm, his use of force is excused.”  Id. at 815.  
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material rightness thesis into two forms: one holds that the belief has to be 
reasonable, as well as true; the other denies that it has to be reasonable.  I shall in 
what follows ignore that complexity). 
In the remainder of this essay I will argue against both versions of the 
material rightness thesis.  I will argue, in other words, both that justification 
requires a belief that the facts are as they would have to be for the action to be 
permissible, and that justification does not require that the belief be true (as long as 
it is held on reasonable grounds).34  There is much more to say than I have the 
space to say here, and I will not be able to do more than put a dent in the support 
enjoyed by the material rightness thesis.  I shall focus not on reviewing the 
literature, but rather on addressing what seem to me to be the strongest arguments 
for the material rightness thesis. 
 
VII. 
 
Fortunately, my remarks in Parts III and V have already done some of the 
work of undercutting arguments for the material rightness thesis.  That justification 
requires truth and does not require (reasonable) belief is supported by the claim 
that justification does not apply to agents, but only to actions; and I called that 
claim into question.   
The fact, to which I drew attention in Part VI—that “right” is used not only to 
mean “materially right,” but also “formally right”—also helps to weaken the case 
for the material rightness thesis.  Although the distinction is unlikely to be news to 
anyone who has written on the subject of justifications and excuses, it seems not to 
be sufficiently attended to.  It is familiar enough; we employ the notion of formal 
rightness when we say that while, with hindsight, it is clear that action A was the 
wrong choice, it is also clear that the agent acted as well as anyone in that situation 
could have acted.  Notice that the claim is not that she acted as well as we could 
expect anyone in that situation to have acted.  That might suggest an excuse (the 
thought being that it would be too much to ask of a person that he or she opt for 
what in fact she should have seen as the right choice).  We are not excusing the 
actor.  Rather, we are recognizing that although it later turned out that contrary to 
                                                                                                                            
Leidholm requires for justification both truth and a reasonable belief “that circumstances exist which 
permit him to use defensive force.”  Id. at 815–16.  To see the contrast between this view and more 
typical treatment of self-defense and justification in general in the United States, see DRESSLER, 
supra note 7, at 214–15. 
34  Because of space limitations, I will say less on the question of whether belief should be 
required than on the question of whether truth should be.  I think the importance of requiring belief is 
less in doubt than the claim that reasonable belief suffices for justification.  As Arthur Ripstein 
observes, “The person who uses deadly force without believing his life is in danger was prepared to 
use that force without being in danger.  Since the danger is irrelevant to his use of force, such a 
person is no different from the person who kills in the absence of danger.  As a result, he should not 
be able to avail himself of self-defense.”  ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE 
LAW 192 (1999).  
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what a reasonable (and duly diligent) person would have anticipated, the action 
was (materially) wrong, the actor’s conduct was beyond reproach.  
If it is objected that the fact that we recognize and regularly employ a 
distinction between formal and material rightness thesis does not decide anything 
for or against the material rightness thesis, I grant that point; nonetheless, the 
distinction brings into relief a problem that confronts us if we hold the view that 
justification requires truth.  The view either ignores the possibility that an action 
can be formally right but not materially right, or holds that it has no bearing on 
how the actor should be viewed.  If the latter, the view presumably is that it does 
not matter whether the actor is seen as having erred—erred in a way that deserves 
to be excused given the weakness of human nature or the particular disabilities of 
the agent—or is instead seen as having conducted himself admirably, or at least 
adequately.  But to most of us, I think, it does indeed matter whether we are told, 
“We won’t blame you; we understand that it would be too much to ask you to do 
better than you did”; or instead, “We won’t blame you; for heaven’s sake, you 
conducted yourself in a way that was exemplary [or at least: perfectly 
reasonable].”  As Hamish Stewart has put it, a system of criminal law ought not 
say that “a person who has acted reasonably on a reasonably held belief has done a 
criminal wrong (even an unpunishable one).”35   
The distinction between formal and material rightness helps us detect 
arguments that trade on the ambiguity.  “[M]istakes cannot justify homicide,” 
writes Fletcher; and that sounds like a compelling reason for tying justification to 
truth if we think of “justify” as meaning that it makes materially right what 
otherwise is not materially right.36  “Justify” is a slippery term, and when we are 
thinking of material rightness, we are thinking of the action in isolation from the 
actor.  If it is asked, “Under what circumstances is intentional killing justified?”, 
“When the actor was mistaken” is not a good answer, not even part of a good 
answer.  “When the actor mistakenly thought, and on reasonable grounds, that the 
elements that warrant the use of lethal force in self-defense were present,” 
although better, is still on the wrong track, for the question calls for an answer that 
explains the circumstances in which intentional killing is materially right.  But the 
                                                                                                                            
35  Hamish Stewart, The Role of Reasonableness in Self-Defence, 16 CANADIAN J.L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 317, 336 (2003). 
36  Fletcher, supra note 24, at 973.  Another argument that loses some of its punch once the 
distinction between formal and material rightness is attended to comes from Michael S. Moore:  
If you mistakenly believe that another is trying to kill you and you use deadly force 
in self-defense, you might in ordinary idiom be said to be “justified” in what you did.  
But what you did was in fact wrong—it was a non-necessary killing—no matter how 
reasonable you may have been in believing and acting as you did.  Your mistake is 
wholly irrelevant to the wrongness of your action, relevant as it may be to your 
culpability for doing that wrongful action.   
MOORE, supra note 32, at 65.  It is indeed irrelevant to the material wrongness of your action but not 
to its formal wrongness. 
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latter answer is—or so I claim—part of the correct answer to the question, “Under 
what circumstances has an agent acted justifiably in intentionally killing another?”  
Fletcher’s argument is far less compelling once we attend to the ambiguity of 
“justify.” 
I turn now to some arguments, not already mentioned, in support of tethering 
justification to truth rather than to reasonable belief.  The first takes as its target the 
requirement, for justification, that the agent have the relevant beliefs.  Legal 
justification should be distinguished from moral justification, the argument goes; 
and for purposes of legal justification, it does not matter whether the agent held the 
relevant belief(s).  If we think it does, that is because we are confusing legal 
justification with moral justification.37
In support of the claim that legal justification should be distinct from moral 
justification, one might point to the sharp contrast between legality and morality 
(at least from a Kantian perspective).  Legality requires only that my conduct 
conform to the law, not that I realize it does, nor that my motivation be this rather 
than that.  Morality, on the other hand, requires not just that my actions not be 
“outwardly” immoral, but that my motivation be what it should be—or at least not 
be what it should not be.  I act lawfully when I do not steal, even if I refrain from 
stealing only because I am afraid of being either injured or arrested, whereas 
morality (Aristotelian and Kantian, anyway) requires that I refrain for the right 
reasons.  Likewise, I act immorally if I have sex with someone I believe to be a 
minor (assuming, at least, that I am more than just a year or two older than the age 
I take him to be), even if in fact he is not a minor; but (unless I am violating some 
other law, for example, a law prohibiting attempted statutory rape) if he is not a 
minor, the fact that I believe he is does not make my action illegal.  And, one 
might go on to say, I do not act illegally in these circumstances. 
This lends some support to the claim that if I kill someone out of a desire to 
get revenge, not knowing that unless I kill him, he will kill me, I cannot be guilty 
of murder because I have a justification for having killed him: he would otherwise 
have killed me.  For, one might argue, the claim sounds peculiar only to those who 
conflate legal with moral justification.  If we do not, we can grant that morally I 
was not justified in killing him, while at the same time maintaining that legally, I 
was.38 
                                                                                                                            
37  This argument is loosely suggested by UNIACKE, supra note 3, at ch. 2, but her position is 
more nuanced.  She draws a distinction between agent-perspectival justification and objective 
justification, and holds that the former is compatible with the agent having a mistaken belief, while 
the latter is not. 
38  I should note here another point that is sometimes introduced in an effort to lay to rest 
misgivings about allowing that someone who killed in such circumstances was legally justified in 
acting as he or she did.  “Surely,” the person with the misgivings says, “I should be no less liable for 
murder if I killed out of revenge, not knowing that the victim in fact was about to kill me, than if I 
killed out of revenge and the victim was not about to kill me.  My culpability is the same in each 
case.”  In reply it is pointed out that things are not as bad as they might seem; in the latter scenario I 
would not be off the hook, legally.  Although it is true that I could not be convicted of murder, I 
could still be convicted of attempted murder.  Those who still are dissatisfied are invited to think 
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But does that last point really hold up?  Does the distinction between legality 
and morality really support the distinction between legal justification and moral 
justification?  No.  It would if the point of justifications were to defeat the actus 
reus requirement (and if we agreed that the actus reus of murder is unlawful 
killing, building into the definition of “unlawful” that the victim had not been 
about to kill the defendant).  Then, because there is no moral analogue to the actus 
reus requirement, we could say that legal justification does differ importantly from 
moral justification: once the actus reus requirement is shown not to be met, there is 
no possibility of convicting the accused of that particular crime.  If self-defense 
and the other justifications were not affirmative defenses but a way of showing that 
the elements of the offense had not been proven, then yes, we could plausibly 
claim that D, who killed V without realizing that V was about to kill D—indeed, 
without realizing that V was about to attack D at all—was justified in killing V.39
Let’s imagine that that is the point of self-defense and the other justifications.  
If it is, and if we decide to understand justification to require truth and not to 
require belief, we will then need another term for what many of us call 
“justifications” (and what is understood as justification in Anglo-American self-
defense law).  Put differently, if justifications are to be understood as ways of 
defeating the actus reus requirement, we will need to enrich our conceptual 
apparatus so as to have something besides excuses, on the one hand, and on the 
other, justifications as they are understood in the proposal being considered (i.e., as 
ways of showing that the actus reus requirement is not met).  This attempt to 
buttress the material rightness thesis by claiming that the position seems 
counterintuitive only to those who conflate legal justification with moral 
justification has a cost.  It gets rid of the notion of justification in law by dissolving 
it into something different, namely, into negation of the act element.   
Of course it might be argued that we can easily enough make do with excuses, 
on the one hand, and, on the other, arguments to show that the actus reus 
                                                                                                                            
about how it works in general with attempt crimes (specifically, those that involve a mistake 
regarding a material element of the crime): If I shoot someone, aiming for the heart, but he turns out 
to be wearing a bulletproof vest, I am liable only for attempted murder, not for murder; yet I am just 
as culpable as if I had killed him. 
Should that lay to rest all misgivings about liability in the case where I kill out of revenge 
someone who was about to kill me?  I think not.  First, we might take issue with the differential 
treatment of those guilty of such attempts and their “successful” counterparts.  Second, we might 
question the parallel.  In the bulletproof vest case, I really was attempting but not succeeding in doing 
something: I was attempting to kill someone, but failing because he was shielded by his vest.  But in 
the other case, I did exactly what I set out to do.  What we have is a completed crime, not an 
attempted one.   
39  I am relying here on the distinction between offense and defense, and the classification of 
self-defense as a defense; but I take it that is not problematic, since among most legal theorists 
neither the distinction nor the classification of self-defense as a defense is controversial.  And there 
are constitutional reasons for sharply distinguishing between negating the elements of the offense and 
offering an affirmative defense (at least in the United States).  See DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 201–
02. 
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requirement (or for that matter, the mens rea requirement) was not met.  It might 
be argued, in other words, that justifications understood as applying mainly to the 
agent—where we are saying “S was justified in doing A” or “S’s doing of A was 
justified”—are really just excuses, thinly disguised.  My reply is as suggested 
above: we are all well aware that there is a difference between being judged to 
have acted on reasonable beliefs (i.e., reasonably), and being judged to have acted 
in a way that is wrong but not blameworthy.  The difference is particularly striking 
if one has acted “as the most competent practitioner in his field would have 
acted.”40  One would be understandably miffed (if not outraged) to be told that 
what one did was “excusable” if one had done everything as well as anyone 
possibly could have in the circumstances (given the information accessible to one, 
and which, let’s imagine, one went to some trouble to obtain). 
 
VIII. 
 
I turn now to a set of objections often put forward by those who hold that 
justification requires truth.41  The first concerns the right to resist an attack.  
Assuming that the right to resist turns on whether the attack is justified, those of us 
who hold that justification requires only reasonable belief, and not truth, seem to 
be stuck with the unfortunate implication that if I am attacked by someone who 
mistakenly but reasonably believes that I was about to attack her, I do not have the 
right to resist her assault.  After all, she is acting justifiably—if we allow mistakes 
to be compatible with justification.  Hence, I am not justified if I resist her attack. 
Something seems wrong here, and the problem is thought to lie with the 
reasonable belief view of justification.  To avoid what everyone agrees would be a 
bad implication—that I am not justified in resisting the attack of someone who 
attacks me, if she mistakenly (but reasonably) believed that I was about to attack 
her—it is suggested that we need to say that she was not justified (so that we can 
then say that I am justified).  But the problem lies elsewhere: the critics are 
forgetting to drop their own notion of justification when they formulate what is 
supposed to be a problem for the reasonable belief view.  If I am attacked by 
someone, then whether I am justified in resisting attack depends not—on the 
reasonable belief view of justification—on whether my attacker is in fact justified 
in attacking me; it hangs, rather, on whether I believe, on reasonable grounds, p, 
                                                                                                                            
40  Greenawalt, supra note 21, at 1909. 
41  The main source of these is George Fletcher, though others have endorsed the objections.  
FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 762 n.11 (“A valid justification . . . affects a matrix of legal relationships.  
The victim has no right to resist, and other persons acquire a right to assist—apart from one exception 
that need not detain us,” namely, “the case in which the person behind the scenes exploits a justifying 
set of facts in order to inflict harm on another”); see also Dressler, supra note 29, at 1173 (“If A 
provides D with a gun in order to kill V, and D is acquitted on the ground of self-defense, it follows 
that A should also be acquitted of the offense since she has aided the primary party to commit a 
socially acceptable act.”).  Elsewhere, however, Joshua Dressler calls this into question.  See 
Dressler, supra note 30, at 95–97. 
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where p stands for all those things which if true, render what would otherwise be 
unlawful aggression, lawful.  So what matters is that I reasonably believe that her 
attack on me is unlawful—not whether it really is.  That means that if she believes 
incorrectly, but on reasonable grounds, that I am about to attack her, then as long 
as I reasonably believe that she is not justified in attacking me, I am justified in 
resisting her attack. 
Now this approach may seem to save the reasonable belief view of 
justification from one attack only to open it to another.  For what if (improbable 
though it hopefully is) I realize that she does—or at least did—have reason to think 
that I was about to attack her?  (Right behind me is a “Wanted: Armed and 
Dangerous” poster and the person pictured in fact looks a lot like me; on top of 
that, I realize that some gestures I made might have suggested belligerence).  Does 
this mean that, recognizing that perhaps she was justified in her attack, I am not 
justified in resisting her attack?  That surely does not sound right.  But how are we 
to handle the problem?42  Critics suggest that the solution is to give up on the 
reasonable belief view of justification, so that what matters is not what she 
reasonably believes, but what is true.  The solution helps here, because I know that 
in fact I am not the person pictured in the “Wanted” poster.  But notice that it does 
not help in other cases involving mistakes where the issue is third party 
intervention.  If, as in the much-discussed case of Young,43 a third party (good-
heartedly and maybe even heroically) comes to the aid of a youth who is struggling 
against what turn out to be plainclothes police officers, it seems wrong to say that 
the action of intervening was unjustified.  On the reasonable belief view, Young’s 
action was justified (assuming he had reasonable grounds, as it appears he did, for 
his belief that the youth had a right to use force to defend himself, and for his 
belief that he needed to use force to prevent further harm to the youth).  On the 
view that justification requires truth, not reasonable belief, Young’s action was not 
justified. 
What we have here are some paradoxes concerning mistaken self-defense, 
some of which are better handled by the (qualified) material rightness thesis, while 
others are better handled by the reasonable belief view of justification.  Rather than 
take the paradoxes to show that the reasonable belief view of justification is 
wrong-headed, we should explore the paradoxes themselves, with a willingness to 
call into question such commonly accepted principles as that two people cannot 
both be justified in resisting each other, and that if and only if S is justified in using 
force in self-defense, anyone is justified in helping her (and no one is justified in 
thwarting her efforts).44 
                                                                                                                            
42  Consider Ripstein’s solution, according to which (a) someone whose actions give rise to a 
reasonable belief that he is an aggressor should therefore be considered an aggressor and (b) mistakes 
regarding identity are not justifications but are (assuming, presumably, that the mistakes are not due 
to negligence or recklessness) excuses.  See RIPSTEIN, supra note 34, § 6.4.  
43  People v. Young, 183 N.E.2d 319 (N.Y. 1962). 
44  For a paper that takes a hard look at such principles, in particular, at the principle that 
justifications cannot conflict, see Douglas N. Husak, Conflicts of Justification, 18 LAW & PHIL. 41 
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There is reason to doubt the principle that if and only if you are justified in 
doing A, anyone is justified in assisting you in doing A.  Certainly outside of a legal 
context it does not always hold.  I may be justified in saying something cutting in 
reply to S’s cutting remarks towards me; but it does not follow that others are 
justified in joining me in directing cutting remarks towards S.  If it is supposed to 
follow from the fact that I am justified in defending myself that you are justified in 
defending me, we need to hear what the suppressed premises are.  It will not do to 
invoke a general principle to the effect that if one is justified in doing A, others are 
justified in aiding one in doing A.45  The ethics of intervention—be it in another 
country’s affairs, another person’s affairs, and for the defense of others or for other 
reasons—are not a simple matter.  It is implausible to suppose that we can read off 
the justifiability of a third party intervention from the justifiability of the 
principal’s conduct. 
What about Fletcher’s claim that it is “contradictory to say that both sides to 
the conflict were justified in their use of force”?46  Or, as Fletcher puts it 
elsewhere, labeling it “the ‘incompatibility thesis’,” “[in] any situation of physical 
conflict, where only one party can prevail, logic prohibits us from recognizing that 
more than one of the parties could be justified in using force.”47  Where is the 
contradiction?  How can logic prohibit us from recognizing that more than one of 
the parties could be justified in using force?  As far as I can tell, Fletcher’s 
principle seems valid only if we either presuppose the positive rightness thesis or 
for some other reason already accept the view in support of which the principle is 
put forward, namely that justification is incompatible with mistakes, and thus is 
tied to truth, rather than to reasonable belief.  If one rejects that view and accepts 
                                                                                                                            
(1999).  I regret that I learned of this paper only as I was making final revisions on my paper, too late 
to draw upon it in my discussion. 
45  Judith Jarvis Thomson discusses these issues in Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 
306 (1991), pointing out that sometimes defending another would “constitute ‘barging in,’ meddling, 
interfering,” and that there are also times where “people should be left to fight their own battles, even 
at the cost of losing some.”  A consideration she does not mention but that I think should weigh in is 
the evidentiary one: there is, arguably, reason to permit acting on slightly scantier evidence in defense 
of oneself or one’s child (or perhaps another loved one) than should be required before one acts if one 
comes upon two strangers, one of whom is attacking another.  In addition, there will (depending on 
the mode of the attack) often be ways a third party can intervene that are not open to the person being 
attacked—to call the police, or to spray the attacker with a hose or otherwise thwart the attack 
without attacking the attacker.  In any case, the situation of a third party is very different from that of 
the person who is under attack, and so one cannot lead off from the fact that the person under attack 
is justified in using force that a third party also is.  The third party must also believe on reasonable 
grounds that using force is necessary, and different considerations will factor in, in support of (or 
against) that belief.   
46  FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 767.  Fletcher writes, “It would strike most Continental theorists 
as contradictory to say that both sides to the conflict were justified in their use of force” and makes it 
clear that he is siding with the Continental theorists.  Id.  Arthur Ripstein observes that Fletcher’s 
principle poses a challenge not only to the reasonable belief view of justification, but to Fletcher’s 
view of justification, as well.  RIPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 197–201. 
47  Fletcher, supra note 24, at 975. 
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the reasonable belief view of justifications, there will be nothing obviously wrong 
in allowing that in such a sad situation, both parties may be justified in using 
force—though of course that need not mean, unless we accept the positive 
rightness thesis, that we think using force was commendable.48   
A third principle that is often invoked in arguments against the reasonable 
belief view of justification is that resistance of a justified act is never justified.  
This is sometimes thought to be established by Ploof v. Putnam.49  But is it?  
Recall the facts of the case: the plaintiff and his family were sailing their sloop 
when a sudden storm left them no choice (short of risking death) but to moor the 
sloop to the defendant’s dock.50  The defendant’s servant “willfully and 
designedly” unmoored the sloop, thereby destroying the sloop and causing injury 
to the plaintiff and his family.51  The wharf owner was liable for damages, for the 
employee’s resistance was unjustified (and the master was held legally responsible 
for his servant’s actions); and it was unjustified because the plaintiff was doing no 
wrong, given the violence of the storm, in mooring it to another’s dock.52  The 
employee had no right to unmoor the sloop. 
If we try to express this by saying that one is never justified in resisting an 
action that itself is justified, we invite confusion, given the ambiguity of 
“justified.”  Do we mean that one is never justified in resisting something that 
itself is permissible, even if the agent has every reason to think that what the other 
is doing is impermissible?  That conclusion—and the implication that mistaken 
self-defense is never justified—is certainly not suggested by Ploof.  It is an 
important, but not very striking, feature of Ploof v. Putnam that the employee 
knew there was a storm and thus should have been able to tell that the yachtsman 
acted permissibly in mooring the sloop to his master’s dock.  There is no room for 
a reasonable mistake here.  (It also is a relevant, and very obvious, feature that 
there was no risk—except possibly slight damage to the dock—in allowing the 
family to moor their sloop to the dock, while the risk to the family if they did not 
help themselves to the dock was great).  The lesson from Ploof (apart from any 
lessons about the responsibility of masters for their employees’ actions) is thus 
best summarized as “[o]ne is never justified in resisting an action which one 
knows, or should know, is permitted” (and one might add “especially when the 
permissible action is necessary for avoidance of serious bodily injury”).  That is 
                                                                                                                            
48  It should be borne in mind that what was a reasonable belief may cease to be a reasonable 
belief if new information comes to light.  On a reasonable belief view of justification, then, one 
would not continue to be justified in intervening if it became clear (or if a reasonable person in the 
agent’s position would have noticed) that the “attackers” were police officers attempting to make a 
lawful arrest. 
49  71 A.2d 188 (Vt. 1908). 
50  Id. at 188. 
51  Id. at 189. 
52  Id. at 189–90. 
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less ringing than “It is never justified to resist a justified action,” but it avoids 
ambiguity and better captures the point.   
 
*  *  * 
 
I hope to have shown in this paper some of the disagreements (including 
different ways of cashing out “right”) that underlie the disagreements about what 
justifications are and how they differ from excuses.  I also hope to have shown that 
some of the reasons given against the reasonable belief view of justification are not 
compelling.  A lot turns on whether one sees justification to apply primarily to 
actions (in isolation from the beliefs, attitudes, etc. of the actor) or primarily to 
agents (or to the agent’s action, viewed as that agent’s action).  I have indicated 
some reasons for thinking that the latter notion of justification is one that we 
should not abandon.  
